Relationship between labeled network games and other cooperative games arising from attributes situations
Sylvain Béal (),
Vito Fragnelli (),
Natividad Llorca and
Economics Letters, 2019, vol. 185, issue C
We study the relationship between cooperative games which arise from very different situations. On the one hand, the labeled network game which is defined to study how to allocate a certain flow in a network among agents that control different parts of the network. On the other hand, the museum pass game which is defined to analyze how to distribute the profit generated by passes which provide visitors unlimited access to the participating museums. We establish that both problems are related in the sense that a museum pass game can be written as a labeled network game and almost all labeled network games can be written as museum pass games. We also point out that these classes of games can be related to other classes of games, for which we provide a generic interpretation in terms of attributes and population.
Keywords: Game theory; Labeled network games; Museum pass games; Shapley value; Attribute situations; Approval voting. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2) Track citations by RSS feed
Downloads: (external link)
Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:185:y:2019:i:c:s0165176519303520
Access Statistics for this article
Economics Letters is currently edited by Economics Letters Editorial Office
More articles in Economics Letters from Elsevier
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Haili He ().