Uniqueness of equilibrium payoffs in the stochastic model of bargaining

Kirill Evdokimov

Economics Letters, 2020, vol. 188, issue C

Abstract: I provide a sufficient condition for the uniqueness of equilibrium payoffs in a model of stochastic bargaining with unanimity rule and risk-averse players. My Condition (S) implies Condition (C) of Merlo and Wilson (1995) and is easy to verify in applications.

Keywords: Stochastic bargaining; Uniqueness; Risk aversion; Unanimity rule (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C78 D71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:188:y:2020:i:c:s0165176519304744

DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2019.108931

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