Conditional cooperation: Type stability across games
Michael Eichenseer and
Economics Letters, 2020, vol. 188, issue C
To classify cooperation types, a sequential prisoner’s dilemma and a one-shot public goods game are convenient experimental setups. We explore the within subject stability of cooperation preferences in these two games. We find that the prisoner’s dilemma performs well in identifying conditional cooperators while it is only an imperfect tool for identifying selfish types in the public goods game.
Keywords: Conditional cooperation; Public goods game; Sequential prisoner’s dilemma; Discrete behavioral types (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C91 H41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:188:y:2020:i:c:s0165176520300021
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