An implementation of the Nash bargaining solution by iterated strict dominance

Shiran Rachmilevitch

Economics Letters, 2020, vol. 188, issue C

Abstract: Anbarcı (2001) presented a modification of the “divide the dollar” game, in which equal division is obtained by iterated removal of strictly dominated strategies. I extend his mechanism to a general Nash demand game and show that it implements the Nash bargaining solution.

Keywords: Iterated strict dominance; Nash bargaining; Nash demand game (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 C78 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:188:y:2020:i:c:s0165176520300112

DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2020.108960

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