Maximal miscommunication

Shintaro Miura and Takuro Yamashita

Economics Letters, 2020, vol. 188, issue C

Abstract: We consider a cheap-talk game à la Crawford and Sobel (1982), where the sender could be an honest type but this probability is not common knowledge. We show that there exists a Harsanyi type space with a unique equilibrium where the receiver may play any action under any state of nature.

Keywords: Cheap-talk games; Honest senders; Harsanyi type spaces; Maximal miscommunication (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:188:y:2020:i:c:s0165176520300124

DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2020.108962

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