Using loss aversion to incentivize energy efficiency in a principal–agent context — Evidence from a field experiment
Christin Hoffmann and
Economics Letters, 2020, vol. 189, issue C
Promoting energy-efficient behavior of agents in a principal–agent context simultaneously decreases costs for firms and mitigates CO2 emissions. Along this line, we analyze the effect of incentive framing on energy-efficient driving behavior. Our results contribute to the understanding of the drawbacks of loss framing. In a situation with persistent labor market relations, an extremely low bonus, and heterogeneous prior performance, the introduction of a bonus framed as a gain outperforms that of a bonus framed as a loss.
Keywords: Energy-efficient behavior; Loss aversion; Field experiment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C93 Q49 M52 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:189:y:2020:i:c:s0165176520300264
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