Using sub-majoritarian rules to select the winner of a competition

Pablo Amoros

Economics Letters, 2020, vol. 190, issue C

Abstract: We study the problem of aggregating expert judgments to decide the winner of a competition. Experts can be biased and then their preferences are not necessarily aligned with their judgments. Society’s optimal choice relies only on the experts’ judgments. A social choice rule (SCR) is sub-majoritarian with quota q≤n2 (being n the number of experts) if, whenever there is at least one candidate that at least q of the experts think is best, the SCR selects one of these candidates. Because the experts’ judgments are not contractual, the social planner has to design a mechanism that implements the SCR. We determine a necessary condition of impartiality on the group of experts for a sub-majoritarian SCR with quota q≥2 to be implementable in an ordinal equilibrium concept.

Keywords: Mechanism design; Social choice aggregation of experts’ judgments; Sub-majoritarian choice rule (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D71 D78 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0165176520300719
Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:190:y:2020:i:c:s0165176520300719

DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2020.109068

Access Statistics for this article

Economics Letters is currently edited by Economics Letters Editorial Office

More articles in Economics Letters from Elsevier
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Catherine Liu ().