Common-value group contests with asymmetric information

Din Cohen and Aner Sela

Economics Letters, 2020, vol. 192, issue C

Abstract: We study contests between two groups where all the players have a common value of winning. In each group one of the players has an information advantage over the other players. This player is referred to as the dominant player. We show that a group contest is equivalent to a contest between the dominant players, and, as such, the expected total effort of both groups is always the same, while their probabilities of winning as well their expected total payoff are not.

Keywords: Group contests; Asymmetric information (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D44 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Working Paper: COMMON-VALUE GROUP CONTESTS WITH ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION (2020)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:192:y:2020:i:c:s0165176520301270

DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2020.109164

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