Stochastically perturbed payoff observations in an evolutionary game

Li Li, Zichun Xu and Hui Wang

Economics Letters, 2020, vol. 192, issue C

Abstract: Allowing there to be imperfect information with respect to payoffs is shown to affect the equilibria of an evolutionary game. For the coordination game, we find that, the replicator dynamic with Brownian motion need not result in coordination.

Keywords: Evolutionary game; Noisy signals; Coordination; Equilibrium selection (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:192:y:2020:i:c:s0165176520301294

DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2020.109167

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