Sovereign rating after private and official restructuring
Silvia Marchesi () and
Tania Masi ()
Economics Letters, 2020, vol. 192, issue C
This paper studies the relationship between sovereign debt (final) restructuring and sovereign ratings, by distinguishing between commercial and official debt and by considering the creditors’ loss (haircut). Institutional Investor’s index is taken as a measure of a country’s creditworthiness. We find that while a restructuring with private creditors seems to involve some reputational costs, ”official defaulters” are not affected (or may even benefit) by the restructuring episodes. Using the Synthetic Control Method, we find further evidence for the heterogeneity of the economic impact of debt restructurings, confirming that official and private restructurings may have different costs and then induce selective defaults.
Keywords: Sovereign restructuring; Institutional investor; Synthetic control method (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: F34 G15 G24 H63 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:192:y:2020:i:c:s0165176520301348
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