Talking to influence

Dell’Era, Michele

Economics Letters, 2020, vol. 192, issue C

Abstract: I study expert advice when an expert benefits from being perceived as influential. A paradox arises: the stronger is a client’s expected need of advice, the worse is expert advice. The reason is that the expert’s benefit from influence engenders an incentive to misreport information which makes quality of expert advice depend negatively on the client’s expected need of advice.

Keywords: Expert advice; Influence-hungry experts (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D82 D83 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:192:y:2020:i:c:s0165176520301403

DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2020.109190

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