Voting over redistribution in the Meltzer–Richard model under interdependent labor inputs

Armando R. Lopez-Velasco

Economics Letters, 2020, vol. 192, issue C

Abstract: This paper extends the median voter result of Meltzer and Richard (1981) to the case where a labor economy has any constant returns to scale production function under quasilinear preferences with constant wage elasticity. Average productivities of the different labor inputs depend on their relative abundance in the economy. Agents are heterogeneous due to their labor type and (given type) due to their relative efficiency. They vote over income tax rates which in turn dictate the level of redistribution. The paper shows that preferences over tax rates are single-peaked and hence the median voter theorem applies. This framework connects the scarcity of inputs to the most preferred tax rates.

Keywords: Meltzer–Richard; Median voter; Interdependent labor; Redistribution (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D33 D72 E6 H2 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:192:y:2020:i:c:s0165176520301518

DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2020.109206

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