Weighted component-wise solutions for graph games

Jilei Shi and Erfang Shan

Economics Letters, 2020, vol. 192, issue C

Abstract: This paper generalizes the component-wise egalitarian solutions (Béal et al., 2012) and component-wise proportional solutions (Shan et al., 2016) on graph games in order to take into account the bargaining powers of players on the allocation of the worth or the centralities of players on the graphs. The bargaining powers or centralities of players are represented by measure functions depending on individuals or the structures of graphs. We define the weighed component-wise solutions such that the payoffs of the players are proportional to their weights. By providing more concise axioms than the previous ones in Béal et al. (2012); Shan et al. (2016), we characterize the weighed component-wise solutions.

Keywords: TU-game; Graph game; Myerson value; Proportional solutions; Egalitarian solutions (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 D60 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:192:y:2020:i:c:s0165176520301646

DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2020.109233

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