Alternating-offer bargaining with endogenous commitment

Zhixian Yu

Economics Letters, 2020, vol. 192, issue C

Abstract: We revisit the classical alternating-offer bargaining model, further assuming that players cannot reduce their proposals during the game. In equilibrium, players have history-dependent strategies and do not necessarily reach an agreement immediately in the first stage.

Keywords: Bargaining; Endogenous commitment; Alternating-offer bargaining game; History-dependence (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C78 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:192:y:2020:i:c:s0165176520301713

DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2020.109247

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