Optimal legal standards for competition policy revisited

Jacob Seifert

Economics Letters, 2020, vol. 194, issue C

Abstract: I extend the model of legal standards in Katsoulacos and Ulph (2009) to allow for optimal statistical decision-making by the regulator. I show that an effects-based standard produces weakly lower decision error costs than a per se standard in this setting. I also use the framework to highlight an important implicit assumption underlying the comparison of legal standards in the cited paper.

Keywords: Competition policy; Legal standards; Per se; Effects-based (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: K2 L4 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0165176520302299
Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:194:y:2020:i:c:s0165176520302299

DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2020.109359

Access Statistics for this article

Economics Letters is currently edited by Economics Letters Editorial Office

More articles in Economics Letters from Elsevier
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Catherine Liu ().