Targeted disclosure and monetary policy flexibility: A simple model

Prasanna Gai, Edmund Lou and Sherry X. Wu

Economics Letters, 2020, vol. 194, issue C

Abstract: We show how limited disclosure of the central bank’s private information to select audiences facilitates policy flexibility between scheduled monetary policy meetings. We also clarify when such disclosure is welfare-enhancing.

Keywords: Central bank communication; Targeted disclosure; Market expectations (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D82 E52 E58 G10 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:194:y:2020:i:c:s0165176520302354

DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2020.109371

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