Manipulative agendas in four-candidate elections

Ritxar Arlegi and Dinko Dimitrov

Economics Letters, 2020, vol. 194, issue C

Abstract: We consider a setting where it is known for an electorate what probability a given candidate has of beating another in a pairwise ballot. An agenda assigns candidates to the leaves of a binary tree and is called manipulative if it inverts the final winning probabilities for two candidates. We compare standard and symmetric agendas in four-candidate elections and show that in monotone environments the former are more manipulative.

Keywords: Agenda; Binary tree; Elections; Manipulation; Sequential voting (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D02 D71 D72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:194:y:2020:i:c:s0165176520302615

DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2020.109418

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