Preference reversal and group strategy-proofness

Dolors Berga and Bernardo Moreno ()

Economics Letters, 2020, vol. 196, issue C

Abstract: We study the problem of choosing one alternative given agent’s strict preferences. We show that preference reversal (Eliaz, 2004) implies group strategy-proofness. Moreover, they are equivalent for the special cases where only two or three alternatives may be chosen.

Keywords: Social choice function; Group strategy-proofness; Preference reversal (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C78 D70 D71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:196:y:2020:i:c:s0165176520303037

DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2020.109493

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