A Ricardian rationale for the WTO rules on R&D subsidies

Yumi Koh and Gea M. Lee

Economics Letters, 2020, vol. 196, issue C

Abstract: The WTO subsidy rules use two key criteria, specificity and adverse effects, to regulate R&D subsidies. Using the model of Dornbusch et al. (1977), we offer a Ricardian rationale for the regulatory criteria.

Keywords: SCM Agreement; R&D subsidies; Beggar-thy-neighbor policies (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: F13 H25 O32 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:196:y:2020:i:c:s0165176520303062

DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2020.109500

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