Optimal legal standards for competition policy further re-visited

Yannis Katsoulacos and David Ulph

Economics Letters, 2020, vol. 196, issue C

Abstract: Katsoulacos and Ulph (2009) showed how all the factors identified as being relevant to choosing between a Per Se and an Effects-Based legal standard in terms of their decision error costs could be combined into a simple formula for determining which standard to use. Seifert (2020) gives an alternative characterisation of an Effects-Based legal standard and shows that its decision error costs are never higher than those of Per Se We argue that nevertheless our original formula remains valid for choosing between these two legal standards.

Keywords: Legal standards; Per Se; Effects-based; Decision errors; Bayesian updating (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: K21 K23 K4 L4 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0165176520303499
Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:196:y:2020:i:c:s0165176520303499

DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2020.109578

Access Statistics for this article

Economics Letters is currently edited by Economics Letters Editorial Office

More articles in Economics Letters from Elsevier
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Catherine Liu ().