Does bundling induce adverse selection in insurance?

Francis Annan

Economics Letters, 2020, vol. 196, issue C

Abstract: Bundling credit with insurance contracts is a common approach to increasing insurance take-up, especially in low income-environments. I document that this approach can induce adverse selection in insurance; thus, acting as an important source of inefficiency.

Keywords: Adverse selection; Insurance; Credit; Bundling; Regulation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D82 G22 O12 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:196:y:2020:i:c:s0165176520303542

DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2020.109588

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