Voluntary information disclosure to Cournot oligopolists
Gagan Ghosh and
Heng Liu
Economics Letters, 2020, vol. 197, issue C
Abstract:
This note studies information disclosure by a planner to firms engaging in a Cournot competition with uncertain demand. The planner can send verifiable, either public or private, messages to firms about the states of the world before they choose quantities but cannot ex ante commit to an information disclosure policy. We show that all equilibria induce the same outcome: firms fully learn the state. Using an example, we also show that without public messages, the commitment solution can be an equilibrium outcome.
Keywords: Verifiable information disclosure; No commitment; Cournot competition (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D44 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:197:y:2020:i:c:s016517652030375x
DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2020.109615
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