Competition for networked agents in the lottery Blotto game

Qian Jiao and Jin Xu

Economics Letters, 2020, vol. 197, issue C

Abstract: This paper examines a duopoly setting in which two firms target their marketing budgets to agents embedded in a social network. Depicting the competition between two firms as a lottery Blotto game, we characterize the equilibrium marketing strategies and study how the network externality affects firms’ marketing decision. Examples of networks are further provided to illustrate how the marketing strategies depend on the agents’ network structures and the strength of network effect.

Keywords: Competition; Lottery Blotto game; Marketing; Social network; Network externality (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D43 L14 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:197:y:2020:i:c:s0165176520304043

DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2020.109644

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