Correlation neglect in voting decisions: An experiment

Johannes Moser and Niklas Wallmeier

Economics Letters, 2021, vol. 198, issue C

Abstract: We investigate the influence of correlation neglect on information aggregation when a voter has to weigh external information about profitability against her risk preferences. In an online experiment, subjects are members of a group and vote either for a fixed payment or for a lottery of the same expected value. They receive signals which alternative may result in an additional bonus or penalty for their group. Our results suggest that subjects flip their vote because of correlation neglect.

Keywords: Correlation neglect; Voting; Bounded rationality; Experiment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C90 D72 D83 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:198:y:2021:i:c:s016517652030416x

DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2020.109656

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