Public information and global games with strategic complements and substitutes

Kyounghun Lee and Frederick Dongchuhl Oh

Economics Letters, 2021, vol. 199, issue C

Abstract: This study examines the effects of public information on players’ actions in global games with strategic complements and substitutes. Specifically, we consider the protest game, wherein a group of citizens decide whether to participate in a protest against a government. After observing private signals and a public signal about the government’s strength, each citizen decides whether or not to participate in the protest. The participation can be both strategic complements and strategic substitutes because the number of protesters increases both the probability of protest success and the probability of a government crackdown. We find that the likelihood of protest success decreases (increases) with the precision of the public signal if the government’s strength is expected to be strong (weak). However, increasing the precision of the public signal is more likely to reduce citizens’ participation as protest decisions exhibit more strategic substitutability.

Keywords: Protest game; Global game; Strategic complements; Strategic substitutes; Public information (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C79 D82 D83 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:199:y:2021:i:c:s0165176520304638

DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2020.109703

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