Population uncertainty and revealing contestants

Bara Kim and Seung Han Yoo

Economics Letters, 2021, vol. 199, issue C

Abstract: A number of contestants randomly arrives according to a Poisson distribution. Under population uncertainty, a contest designer considers whether or not to reveal the number of players to bidders. We show that for the expected revenue, the two policies are equivalent, but for the expected winner’s payment, the revealing policy dominates if the expected number of bidders is sufficiently large, whereas the concealing policy dominates if it is low.

Keywords: Contest; Population uncertainty; Environmental equivalence (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D44 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:199:y:2021:i:c:s0165176521000045

DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2021.109727

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