Group incentive compatibility and welfare for matching with contracts
Economics Letters, 2021, vol. 202, issue C
In the matching with contracts framework, under the assumption that each hospital has a choice function that satisfies the observable substitutability condition, we show that the strategy-proof cumulative offer mechanism is no longer guaranteed to be group strategy-proof, yet it nevertheless outputs a weakly Pareto efficient outcome for any input. We also discuss why, unlike the previous observations in the literature, the equivalence of strategy-proofness and group strategy-proofness does not carry over to our context.
Keywords: Matching with contracts; Observable substitutability; Strategy-proofness; Group strategy-proofness; Pareto efficiency (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C78 D44 D47 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:202:y:2021:i:c:s0165176521001014
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