Partial information disclosure in a contest

Derek J. Clark and Tapas Kundu

Economics Letters, 2021, vol. 204, issue C

Abstract: Zhang and Zhou (2016) use the concept of Bayesian persuasion due to Kamenica and Gentzkow (2011) to analyze information disclosure in a contest with one-sided asymmetric information. They show that an effort-maximizing designer can manipulate information disclosure to increase expected efforts in the contest, based upon active contest participation by all types of the informed player. We allow some informed types to exert no effort in the contest, showing how this (i) can increase the applicability of the previous results, and (ii) in some cases, can change the type of information disclosure.

Keywords: Contest; Information design; Bayesian persuasion (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D02 D72 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:204:y:2021:i:c:s0165176521001920

DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2021.109915

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