Lorenz optimality for sequencing problems with welfare bounds

Sreoshi Banerjee and Manipushpak Mitra

Economics Letters, 2021, vol. 205, issue C

Abstract: In the sequencing context, we explore the possibility of designing mechanisms which uphold the notion of justness and safeguard an agent’s individual interest. Every agent is guaranteed a minimum level of utility by imposing the generalized minimum welfare bound. Our main result shows that the constrained egalitarian mechanism is Lorenz optimal in the class of mechanisms that are feasible and satisfy the generalized minimum welfare bound.

Keywords: Sequencing; Feasibility; Generalized minimum welfare bound; Lorenz criterion; Constrained egalitarianism (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D31 D63 D71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:205:y:2021:i:c:s0165176521002408

DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2021.109963

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