Stability and immunity to capacity manipulation in large matching markets

Morteza Honarvar and Behrang Kamali Shahdadi

Economics Letters, 2021, vol. 206, issue C

Abstract: Stable mechanisms are not strategy-proof in matching markets; however, they work well in practice. We study the college admission problem where colleges have completely heterogeneous preferences, and there is a continuum of students. We find an upper bound for the colleges’ capacities vector such that colleges have the incentive to report their capacities truthfully in any stable mechanism.

Keywords: Matching theory; Market design; Large market (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C78 D47 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:206:y:2021:i:c:s0165176521002792

DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2021.110002

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