Tariff evasion with endogenous enforcement

Adrien Bussy

Economics Letters, 2021, vol. 207, issue C

Abstract: I show theoretically and empirically that when the expected punishment for evading increases with the tariff rate, evasion via under-reporting may decrease when the tariff rate rises. Total evasion does not necessarily decrease, as importers use alternative ways to evade duties.

Keywords: Tariff evasion; Tax enforcement; International trade; Corruption (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: F14 H26 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:207:y:2021:i:c:s0165176521003232

DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2021.110046

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