Anchored strategic reasoning

Radosveta Ivanova-Stenzel and Gyula Seres

Economics Letters, 2022, vol. 212, issue C

Abstract: We propose a model whereby players’ beliefs about the opponents’ reasoning are anchored to an irrelevant number. The model predicts that strategies are adjusted toward the anchor if they are complements. If strategies are substitutes, adjustments away are also possible.

Keywords: Anchoring bias; Auctions; Games; Incomplete information; Strategy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D01 D91 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2022
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:212:y:2022:i:c:s0165176522000349

DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2022.110330

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