Inference on incomplete information games with multi-dimensional actions
Hideyuki Tomiyama and
Taisuke Otsu
Economics Letters, 2022, vol. 215, issue C
Abstract:
By extending de Paula and Tang (2012) and Aradillas-López and Gandhi (2016), we derive testable restrictions for uniqueness of equilibrium in games with multi-dimensional actions. We discuss two models of payoff functions which imply certain covariance restrictions for players’ actions. These restrictions can be used to construct an identified set of strategic parameters under multiple equilibria.
Keywords: Multiple equilibria; Partial identification; Moment inequalities (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C14 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2022
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:215:y:2022:i:c:s0165176522000933
DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2022.110440
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