Implementation in dominant strategies of quota rules to choose one candidate

Pablo Amoros

Economics Letters, 2022, vol. 216, issue C

Abstract: A group of n experts has to pick one winner from a group of candidates. Each expert has a judgment about who is the best candidate. A social choice rule (SCR) is a function that aggregates experts’ judgments to determine the deserving winner. Experts may be biased and not want to reveal their judgments. We state a necessary and sufficient condition for implementing an SCR in dominant strategies. We show that no q-supermajoritarian SCR with q≤n−1 or q-submajoritarian SCR with q≥2 satisfies this condition.

Keywords: Deserving winner; Impartial experts; Implementation; Supermajority rules; Submajority rules (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D71 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2022
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:216:y:2022:i:c:s0165176522001586

DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2022.110557

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