Economics at your fingertips  

Impacts of boycotts concerning the Shapley value and extensions

Manfred Besner

Economics Letters, 2022, vol. 217, issue C

Abstract: If a player boycotts another player, it means that the cooperation gains of all coalitions containing both players vanish. In the associated coalition function, both players are now disjointly productive with respect to each other. The disjointly productive players property states that a player’s payoff does not change when another player who is disjointly productive to that player is removed from the game. We show that the Shapley value is the only TU-value that satisfies efficiency and the disjointly productive players property and for which the impact of a boycott is the same for the boycotting and the boycotted player. Analogous considerations are made for the proportional Shapley value and the class of (positively) weighted Shapley values.

Keywords: Cooperative game; (Weighted/proportional) Shapley value; Disjointly productive players; (Weighted/proportional) Impacts of boycotts (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2022
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: Track citations by RSS feed

Downloads: (external link)
Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link:

DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2022.110685

Access Statistics for this article

Economics Letters is currently edited by Economics Letters Editorial Office

More articles in Economics Letters from Elsevier
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Catherine Liu ().

Page updated 2022-11-12
Handle: RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:217:y:2022:i:c:s0165176522002312