In-group favoritism in natural and minimal groups

Catherine Eckel, Rick K. Wilson and Sora Youn

Economics Letters, 2022, vol. 219, issue C

Abstract: We examine giving to an in-group member relative to an out-group member in the third party (other-other) dictator game. Individuals are randomly assigned to real groups under a “weak” and a “strong” condition, and also assigned to artificial groups using the minimal group paradigm. We compare the effect of the type of group on subject’s allocation of an amount of money between an in-group member and a person who is not a member of the in-group, using a within-subject design with repeated measures. We find that the Weak and Strong real group conditions bracket the Minimal group condition.

Keywords: In-group favoritism; Altruism; Dictator game; Experimental economics (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C91 D64 D91 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2022
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:219:y:2022:i:c:s0165176522002890

DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2022.110794

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