Private protection against crime and public policing: Political economy considerations

Tim Friehe and Murat C. Mungan

Economics Letters, 2022, vol. 220, issue C

Abstract: Private protection and public policing interact in combatting property crime. While private protection can be tailored to property values by owners, the level of public policing is chosen by elected officials for society as a whole. When the median voter’s property is less valuable than the average property value, the equilibrium level of public policing is excessive (too small), compared to the level that maximizes the collective welfare of property owners, when private protection and public policing are substitutes (complements); but this relationship can be reversed when offenders’ utilities are included in the social welfare function.

Keywords: Crime; Private protection; Public policing; Theft (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: K42 P48 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2022
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:220:y:2022:i:c:s0165176522003329

DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2022.110858

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