Non-manipulability by clones in bankruptcy problems

Pedro Calleja and Francesc Llerena

Economics Letters, 2022, vol. 221, issue C

Abstract: We introduce non-manipulability by clones for bankruptcy problems, which entitles claimants to merge or split only when they are or become identical agents. We show that this weaker non-manipulability requirement, together with either claim monotonicity or claims continuity, allows for new characterizations of the proportional rule on the general class of bankruptcy problems.

Keywords: Proportional rule; Manipulability; Bankruptcy problems (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2022
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:221:y:2022:i:c:s0165176522003950

DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2022.110921

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