Size-dependent minimum-effort games and constrained interactions

Zhiwei Cui, Ge Jiang and Fei Shi

Economics Letters, 2023, vol. 223, issue C

Abstract: This paper develops a model in which agents choose a limited number of partners to play minimum-effort games. The payoff for each agent depends on the minimum of the efforts of her partners and herself, and increases with the size of her interaction neighborhood. We show that when agents interact with everyone with whom they have a link, whoever forms it, coordination on the lowest effort will be (uniquely) selected in the long run.

Keywords: Minimum-effort games; Network formation; Myopic best-response learning (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D83 D85 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2023
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:223:y:2023:i:c:s0165176523000022

DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2023.110977

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