Efficiency and strategy-proofness in multi-unit object allocation problems with non-quasi-linear preferences: A positive result

Hiroki Shinozaki

Economics Letters, 2023, vol. 223, issue C

Abstract: We consider the problem of allocating multiple units of an object to agents with payments. Agents demand at most two units, and have preferences that are not necessarily quasi-linear. We propose a new rule that we call the generalized Vickrey rule with initial ownership of single units, and establish it satisfies efficiency, strategy-proofness, and individual rationality. This contrasts with recent impossibility results for multi-demand non-quasi-linear preferences showing that no rule satisfies the three properties together with no subsidy for losers (Baisa, 2020; Shinozaki et al., 2022).

Keywords: Efficiency; Strategy-proofness; Individual rationality; Non-quasi-linear preferences; Subsidies; Multi-unit auctions (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D44 D47 D71 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2023
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:223:y:2023:i:c:s0165176523000149

DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2023.110989

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