Who wants (them) to work longer?

Benjamin Bittschi and Berthold U. Wigger

Economics Letters, 2023, vol. 227, issue C

Abstract: This paper examines age-specific individual preferences for the legal retirement age. Within a theoretical model, we develop the hypothesis that retirees prefer a higher legal retirement age than workers, and that newly retired individuals prefer the highest retirement age. Retirees benefit from a positive fiscal externality. A higher legal retirement age leads to higher pension benefits, without retirees having to bear the costs in the form of a longer working life. We corroborate the hypothesis empirically with a fuzzy regression discontinuity design and show that newly retired individuals are indeed most in favor of an increasing retirement age. We conclude that in aging societies the political feasibility of raising the legal retirement age increases.

Keywords: Legal retirement age; Age-specific preferences; Pension reform (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 H55 J26 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2023
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:227:y:2023:i:c:s0165176523001477

DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2023.111122

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