A non-lexicographic rule in the preference-approval setting

Guy Barokas

Economics Letters, 2023, vol. 227, issue C

Abstract: We present the first non-lexicographic social ranking rule in the preference-approval setting. Our rule is obtained using three well-known axioms and a novel symmetry axiom, which balances preferences and approval information, thereby avoiding the extreme outcomes seen in existing lexicographic methods. Other non-lexicographic alternatives are discussed.

Keywords: Preference-approval; Social choice; No priority (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D71 D72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2023
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:227:y:2023:i:c:s0165176523001490

DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2023.111124

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