Uniform random dictatorship: A characterization without strategy-proofness

Ali Ozkes and M. Remzi Sanver

Economics Letters, 2023, vol. 227, issue C

Abstract: Although they exclude any possibility of a compromise ex-post, uniform random dictatorship methods provide a solution to conflicts of interest that guarantees an ex-ante fairness. Axiomatic characterizations of random dictatorships in the classical literature of social choice theory use strategy-proofness. In a probabilistic framework that embeds tops-onlyness and anonymity, for three or more alternatives, we provide a characterization that uses an independence condition instead: uniform random dictatorship is the only social choice rule that is efficient and independent. This characterization also establishes that under efficiency and anonymity, independence and strategy-proofness are equivalent. In the particular case of two alternatives, independence becomes vacuous and we propose a characterization without independence.

Keywords: Random dictatorship; Tops-onlyness; Independence; Strategy-proofness (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2023
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Working Paper: Uniform Random Dictatorship: A characterization without strategy-proofness * (2023)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:227:y:2023:i:c:s0165176523001520

DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2023.111127

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