Contests between two groups for a group-specific public-good/bad prize

Kyung Baik

Economics Letters, 2023, vol. 227, issue C

Abstract: We study contests between groups for a group-specific public-good/bad prize in which the contest success function for a group can be represented by a continuous function in each group’s effort level, where each group’s effort level equals the sum of effort levels that the individual players in that group expend. The players expend their effort simultaneously and independently to win the prize or not to win it (or both). Obtaining the pure-strategy Nash equilibrium, we establish that, in each group, only the player with the highest valuation and the player with the lowest valuation may be active. We further establish that there are only two active players, either in the same group or in different groups, and the rest expend zero effort.

Keywords: contest; Rent seeking; Public-good prize; Public-bad prize; Free riding; Externalities; Sabotage activity; Outside allies (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D72 H41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2023
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0165176523001556
Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:227:y:2023:i:c:s0165176523001556

DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2023.111130

Access Statistics for this article

Economics Letters is currently edited by Economics Letters Editorial Office

More articles in Economics Letters from Elsevier
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Catherine Liu ().