A protocol for repeated bargaining

Akihisa Kato and José Víctor Ríos Rull

Economics Letters, 2023, vol. 227, issue C

Abstract: We propose a protocol for repeated bargaining where occasional periods of good outside opportunities yield improved outcomes but also higher breakout probabilities, yet there is a lot of risk sharing. Crucially, we only consider Markov perfect equilibria that have neither non payoff-relevant state variables that are costly to compute nor a contrived process of equilibrium selection.

Keywords: Repeated bargaining; Limited commitment; Markov perfect equilibria (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2023
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:227:y:2023:i:c:s016517652300157x

DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2023.111132

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