Can transparency increase adverse selection? Evidence from an electronic platform for annuities

Eduardo Fajnzylber, M. Florencia Gabrielli and Manuel Willington

Economics Letters, 2023, vol. 228, issue C

Abstract: We show that the introduction of an electronic platform in the Chilean annuity market with the objectives of bringing transparency and enhancing competition also exacerbated adverse selection. The longevity gap between male annuitants and non-annuitants increased around 24 months.

Keywords: Adverse selection; Annuities; Market transparency; Chilean pension system (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D82 G14 G22 J32 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2023
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:228:y:2023:i:c:s016517652300160x

DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2023.111135

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