The economics of satellite deorbiting performance bonds

Nodir Adilov, Peter J. Alexander and Brendan M. Cunningham

Economics Letters, 2023, vol. 228, issue C

Abstract: The rapid accumulation of orbital debris, coupled with the exponentially increasing number of satellites in certain regions of orbital space, impedes and may preclude long-term utilization of these resources. While voluntary satellite deorbiting guidelines are demonstrably ineffective in incentivizing firms to deorbit their expended satellites, we suggest interest-bearing deorbiting performance bonds provide an incentive mechanism that has minimal effect on firms’ operating costs. Not only would this type of bond reduce the rate of growth in orbital debris, these bonds could be tradeable, thus establishing market prices for certain types of orbital debris, both stimulating the market for active debris removal and further encouraging investments in satellite robustness.

Keywords: Tradeable performance bonds; Satellite deorbiting; Economics of satellites; Economics of space; Orbital debris (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: L5 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2023
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:228:y:2023:i:c:s0165176523001751

DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2023.111150

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