The bureaucracy trap

Ascension Andina-Diaz, Francesco Feri and Miguel Meléndez-Jiménez ()

Economics Letters, 2023, vol. 228, issue C

Abstract: We study the incentives of political parties to institute reforms that improve bureaucratic quality and increase the ability of governments to implement policy change. We consider a context of dynamic elections where current rigidities do not permit large changes in policies. We show that reforms in which a sufficient share of benefits are experienced late in time will never be implemented if parties are patient enough.

Keywords: Political alternation; Institutional reform; Bureaucracy trap (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D02 D72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2023
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S016517652300191X
Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

Related works:
Working Paper: The Bureaucracy Trap (2022)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:228:y:2023:i:c:s016517652300191x

DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2023.111166

Access Statistics for this article

Economics Letters is currently edited by Economics Letters Editorial Office

More articles in Economics Letters from Elsevier
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Catherine Liu ().