The order of move in a conversational war of attrition

Christian Decker

Economics Letters, 2023, vol. 228, issue C

Abstract: This paper investigates computationally when and how the order of move matters in a Conversational War of Attrition (Meyer-ter-Vehn et al., 2018). Switching the first mover flips the debate’s outcome for certain type-realizations and triggers two potentially opposing forces on jurors’ ex-ante expected costs. In the finite-horizon version of the game, a last-proposal advantage prevails if the jurors’ bias dominates their impatience, and a first-proposal advantage prevails if impatience dominates bias. In the infinite-horizon version, there is an unambiguous first-proposal advantage. These mechanisms are reminiscent of the Rubinstein (1982) sequential bargaining game.

Keywords: Debate; Conversational war of attrition; Order of move; Rubinstein bargaining; First-mover advantage (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C63 C72 D71 D72 D82 D83 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2023
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:228:y:2023:i:c:s0165176523002069

DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2023.111181

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