Stable and efficient reallocations when preferences are single-dipped

Bas Dietzenbacher and Yuki Tamura

Economics Letters, 2023, vol. 231, issue C

Abstract: Imagine a group of agents, each being endowed with a share of one unit of an infinitely divisible and non-disposable commodity. Each agent has single-dipped preferences. We characterize the Pareto optimal allocations that satisfy individual rationality or coalitional rationality. In particular, we show that Pareto optimal and individually rational allocations always exist, and we provide a necessary and sufficient condition for non-emptiness of the core.

Keywords: resource reallocation; single-dipped preferences; Pareto optimality; core (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D63 D71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2023
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:231:y:2023:i:c:s016517652300318x

DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2023.111293

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